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COMMENTS
THE ETHICS INVOLVED IN REPRESENTING
MULTIPLE PARTIES IN A BUSINESS TRANSACTION:
HOW TO AVOID BEING CAUGHT BETWEEN SCYLLA
AND CHARYBDIS I WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE
MARYLAND DISCIPLINARY RULES
INTRODUCTION
ACT I. Scene 1. [Multiple Representation oj Joint Ventures/
Formation oj Business Entities]. Enter three potential clients into
Attorney Jane's office. Attorney Jane leads the individuals into her
office and asks how she can assist them.
Emily Entrepreneur: Arnold, Betty, and I are entrepreneurs
who are interested in setting up a joint venture to sell
industrial equipment. Essentially, we have worked out the
details and will only require your "legal drafting" assistance
in creating a partnership. Will you represent us? [Fade Out].
ACT I. Scene 2. [Multiple Representation oj Existing Clients].
Attorney John is seated at his desk when the telephone rings. It is
one of his existing clients, Peter Purchaser. The conversation proceeds
as follows:
Peter Purchaser: I have decided to purchase a seafood
restaurant in the downtown area. I want you to draft the
sales contract. I am purchasing the business from Sheila
Seller, who tells me that you are also her attorney. We both
want you to draft the sales agreement. Neither one of us
wants any other attorney involved. Besides, you are the only
attorney either one of us trusts. Will you represent both of
us? [Fade Out].
ACT I. Scene 3. [Multiple Representation in Real Estate Transactions]. Attorney Kate enters Lender Bank's conference room. Seated
at the conference table are Bob Borrower, Sam Seller, and Leon
I.

1. Scylla refers to "a nymph changed into a monster in Greek mythology who
terrorizes mariners in the strait of Messina." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1057 (1984). Charybdis refers to "a whirlpool off the coast
of Sicily personified in Greek myth as a female monster." [d. at 228. The
phrase caught "between Scylla and Charybdis" means having to choose "between two equally hazardous alternatives." [d. at 1057.
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Loan Officer. Attorney Kate is not presently retained by any of the
parties. However, Attorney Kate has represented Lender Bank in the
past.
Leon Loan Officer: We have called this meeting because all
three of us are interested in hiring you as the attorney for
this real estate transaction. Bob Borrower, our customer,
wants to purchase a tract of residential land from Sam
Seller. Lender Bank, of course, will be responsible for the
financing. Your role will be to draft the sales contract and
conduct any necessary title work. Lender Bank already has
the mortgage agreement drafted. In the interest of saving
money, we have decided to each contribute one-third of
your fee. Will you ~ndertake the representation? [Fade Out].
Although each of the preceding hypotheticals is fictitious, similar
dilemmas face attorneys daily. Often, an attorney's knee-jerk reaction
is to avoid a situation involving mUltiple representation. Attorneys
have been indoctrinated since law school with the notion that "the
world is divided into clients and non-clients, and that there is no
place for anything other than uncompromising advocacy in favor of
the one, and aggressive opposition as to the other."2 Additionally,
common sense dictates that the Rule of Matthew be followed: "No
man can serve two masters .... "3
Adopting a rigid Rule of Matthew approach in a multiple
representation situation leads an attorney to overlook several legitimate reasons for undertaking multiple representation. In the case of
the entrepreneurs seeking to form a business entity, multiple representation would be advantageous because the parties are "united in
purpose," and hiring three separate attorneys might create conflicts
that did not already exist. 4 When an attorney is confronted by existing
clients seeking mUltiple representation, the involvement· of additional
attorneys not only may make a simple business transaction "unduly
complicate[d]," but also can "provoke unnecessary and expensive
disputes."5 Furthermore, requiring clients to hire separate attorneys
"pad[s] the pockets" of the profession. 6 Particularly, in the real
estate setting, using one attorney will cost less money, 7 a benefit to
both buyers and sellers who have already incurred costs. A final
2. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 2.2: 102 (2d ed. Supp. 1993).
3. Kenneth Kipnis, Conflict of Interest and Conflict of Obligation (1986), reprinted
in ETIDCS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 283, 285 (Michael Davis & Frederick A.
Elliston eds., 1986).
4. Barry S. Martin, Counsel for the Situation, CAL. LAW., May 1987, at 18, 18.

5.Id.
6. See Louis M. Brown, One Lawyer for Two, BEVERLY HILLS B.A.J., Winter
1986-87, at 50, 50.

7. See id. at 51.
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consideration common to all three scenarios is the overriding public
interest in permitting an individual the right to retain counsel of his
or her own choice. 8
Although each of the preceding arguments contains an element
of truth, the hard reality is that if an attorney declines to represent
multiple parties, he could lose the future business of anyone of
these clients. Declining to represent multiple parties becomes particularly acute when both parties are existing clients; an attorney in this
situation risks losing existing and future business. Yet if the attorney
blindly undertakes the multiple representation, he may create a
situation likely to run afoul of the requirements mandated by the
disciplinary rules. 9
This Comment demonstrates how a Maryland practitioner who
chooses to undertake multiple representation in a business transaction
can do so within the ethical norms of the disciplinary rules. However,
the disciplinary rules address only one facet of the ethical obligations
of an attorney. Therefore, inherent in any discussion of the require-

8. Nathan B. Feinstein, Lawyers' Conflicts Under the Model Rules: A Primer, in
CONFLICTS/ADVERTISING/HANDLING OF CLIENT'S MONEY 84, 88 (The Maryland
Institute for Continuing Professional Education for Lawyers, Inc. ed., 1990);
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARv. L. REV. 1244, 1303-04 (1981) [hereinafter Conflicts of Interest].
9. As used in this Comment, the term "disciplinary rules" generally refers to
each state's statutory enactment governing an attorney's conduct in the practice
of law. More specifically, "disciplinary rules" refers to each state's codification
of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) or the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code). Although the Model Rules are the ABA's most recent enactment, see
infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text, not all states have enacted these
rules. See generally 1 to 4 NAT'L REP. ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROF. REsp. (U.
Publications of Am. 1994) (cataloguing all 50 states' disciplinary rules).
Although lawyers must conduct themselves in accordance with the disciplinary
rules, "[t]he [r]ules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be
completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for
the ethical practice of law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope
(1983) (emphasis added). Although a violation of a disciplinary rule may
subject an attorney to sanctioning by a disciplinary authority, it does not, nor
should it, serve as a basis for civil liability or serve to create any presumption
that a legal duty has been breached. Id. "Accordingly, nothing in the [r]ules
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the
extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty." Id.
The disciplinary rules are typically applied in judicial decisions within the
context of a disqualification proceeding or a fee dispute. Feinstein, supra note
8, at 86. In either case, the court may force the attorney to remit previously
collected attorney's fees if the attorney has violated one or more of the
disciplinary rules. Martin, supra note 4, at 70.
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ments of multiple representation is a complementary discussion of
the legal obligations of attorneys.1O Because multiple representation
in business transactions involves the application of various bodies of
law, and depends, in large measure, on individual factual patterns,
this Comment focuses upon the situations outlined previously in Act
I, Scenes 1 through 3. In addition, this Comment explores the pitfalls
inherent in multiple representation, in an effort to develop a framework for the Maryland practitioner.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Traditionally, the legal community has frowned upon mUltiple
representation. II The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
10. Multiple representation appears to present an ethical dilemma because of an
attorney's fiduciary relationship to each client, and the duties of loyalty and
confidentiality that accompany such a relationship. See, e.g., Homa v. Friendly
Mobile Manor, Inc., 93 Md. App. 337, 346-47, 612 A.2d 322, 326-27 (1992),
cert. granted, 329 Md. 168, 617 A.2d 1085 (1993); see also HENRY S. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETmcs 89-96 (1953) (discussing the lawyer's obligations as a fiduciary).
" 'There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally speaking, one more
honorably and faithfully discharged ... .' " Id. at 89 (quoting Stockton v.
Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850».
11. See GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETmCAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER 64 (1910); 1
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:103; RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETmcs
272-73 (2d ed. 1970); Brown, supra note 6, at 50; John P. Frank, The Legal
Ethics oj Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv. 683, 708-09 (1964); Conflicts
oj Interest, supra note 8, at 1292. The traditional view that an attorney should
avoid representing multiple parties is best summarized by Wise: "'No man
can serve two masters.' If there is the slightest doubt as to whether or not the
acceptance of professional employment will involve a conflict of interest
between two clients ... the employment should be refused." WISE, supra, at
273.
The Maryland appellate courts have also championed the view that "no man
can serve two masters." In Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App.
280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974), the court of special appeals warned that multiple
representation "should generally be avoided" in business transactions. Id. at
300, 327 A.2d at 904. More recently, the court of special appeals reiterated its
position in Blum v. Blum, 59 Md. App. 584, 477 A.2d 289 (1984) (holding
that where one attorney represents both the husband and wife in a domestic
dispute, the separation agreement will not be set aside unless the terms are
unfair and inequitable):
This is not the first time the Court has seen parties apparently relying
on the same attorney. This situation has arisen frequently enough to
suggest to the members of the Bar that no matter how careful they
may be to explain their relationship to each of the parties, they are
advancing at their own peril. Where there is a potential conflict in
interest between the parties, as is true in every domestic dispute, it is
inappropriate to attempt to represent them both. This is true even
where the parties appear to be in full accord at the time.
Id. at 598, 477 A.2d at 296.
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(Model Code), as the predecessor to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules), addresses the issue of multiple representation
in only two subsections of Disciplinary Rule 5-105.1 2 Disciplinary
Rule 5-105(B) states that "[a] lawyer shall not continue multiple
employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment
in [sic] behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected
by his representation of another client.' '13 Therefore, Disciplinary
Rule 5-105(B) prohibits an attorney from representing multiple parties
when an actual conflict develops between those parties. However,
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B)'s prohibition against the representation of
multiple parties is not without limits. Even where a conflict exists
between the parties, an attorney may continue the representation if
he follows the mandates of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C). In the face
of an actual conflict, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) requires an attorney
representing multiple parties to (1) assess the situation and determine
ifhe "can adequately represent the interest of each"; (2) fully disclose
"the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of each"; and (3) obtain
each client's consent to the multiple representation.J4
Although Disciplinary Rule 5-105 generally permits multiple representation, a review of Ethical Considerations 5-14 through 5-17
demonstrates the Model Code's underlying philosophy that multiple
representation should be avoided. IS For example, Ethical Consideration 5-14 discusses the importance of an attorney maintaining his
independent professional judgment, and concludes that an attorney's
judgment becomes compromised "whenever [he] is asked to represent
two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such
interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant."16 Similarly, Ethical Consideration 5-15 urges attorneys to
decline to undertake multiple representation:
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue repre-

sentation of multiple clients having potentially differing
interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his
judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he
accepts or continues the employment. He should resolve all
12. As stated in the preamble to the Model Code, the Disciplinary Rules are
mandatory in character and state the "minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmnlTY Preamble (1980). In contrast, the Canons are
statements of axiomatic norms, and the Ethical Considerations are "aspirational," representing objectives for which attorneys should strive. [d.
13: [d. DR 5-105(B).
14. 1d. DR 5-105(C).
15. See id. EC 5-14 to 5-17.
16. [d. EC 5-14.
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doubts against the propriety of the representation. A lawyer
should never represent in litigation multiple clients with
differing interests .... 17
A review of these Ethical Considerations supports the view that the
Model Code provisions were drafted with the assumption "that the
litigation rules of conduct apply to any lawyering process in which
two or more parties may have separate points of view." 18
Despite the Model Code's warnings about the dangers of multiple
representation, attorneys, nevertheless, engaged in mUltiple representation. Once the rulemakers acknowledged the reality that attorneys
were representing multiple parties and serving in roles much more
expansive than that of an advocate,19 they made changes to the
existing model. In August 1983, the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association (ABA) approved the Model Rules,20 replacing the Model Code. Maryland adopted the Model Rules on
January 1, 1987. 21 In contrast to the Model Code, the Model Rules
recognize that an attorney can, and often does, serve in the dual
roles of advisor and intermediary.22
Specifically, Rule 1.723 serves as the analogue to former Disci17. [d. EC 5-15.
18. Brown, supra note 6, at 50.
19. The preamble to the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) states:
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions.
As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between
clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an
advisor and, to a limited extent, acts as a spokesperson for each
client. A lawyer acts as an evaluator by examining a client's legal
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.
20. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2 (ABA ed. 1987).
According to Stephen GiIIers, the Model Code was in effect for 13 112 years.
Stephen GiIIers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A
Critical View oj the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 243 (1985).
21. MD. RULES 1230 (1994). Once Maryland adopted the Model Rules, these Rules
were referred to as the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. See id.
Appendix. Because Rules 1.7 and 2.2 of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct substantively mirror Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2, this Comment only
discusses and refers to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. Compare MARYLAND RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7 & 2.2 (1994) with MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7 & 2.2 (1983).
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 2.1 & 2.2 (1983).
23. The text of Rule 1.7 reads as follows:
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule
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"Rule 1.7 clarifies [Disciplinary

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
[d. Rule I. 7.
24. [d. Rule 1.7 Model Code Comparison.
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer
May Impair His Independent Professional Judgment.
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure,
a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his
professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiILITY DR 5-IOI(A) (1980).
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests
of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment
of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise
of his independent professional judgment in [sic] behalf of a
client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the
acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except
to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the
exercise of his independent professional judgment in [sic] behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can
adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents
to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect
of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to
withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no
partner, or associate, affiliated with him or his firm may
accept or continue such employment.
[d. DR 5-105 (1980).
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Rule] 5-105(A) by requiring that, when the lawyer's other interests
are involved, not only must the client consent after consultation,"
but in addition to consent, the lawyer must be reasonably convinced
that the representation will "not be adversely affected by the lawyer's
other interests. "25 In contrast, Rule 2.226 has no "direct counterpart"
in the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code,27 although it has been
compared to Disciplinary Rules 5-105(B) and 5-105(C).211 Additionally,
reference to the concept of an intermediary can be found in Model
Code EC 5-20.29
The ABA's adoption of Rule 1.7 and Rule 2.2 supports the
position that multiple representation can be ethical, when undertaken

25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 Model Code Comparison
(1983).
26. The text of Rule 2.2 reads as follows:
Rule 2.2 Intermediary
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages
and risks involved, and the effect of the attorney-client privileges,
and obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved
on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each
client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the
matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the
interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is
unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on
other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each
client concerrung the decisions to be made and the considerations
relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately
informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so
requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no
longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to
represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of
the intermediation.
Id. Rule 2.2.
27. Id. Rule 2.2 Model Code Comparison.
28. See id. For the text of DR 5-105(B)-(C), see supra note 24.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 Model Code Comparison
(1983). EC 5-20 states that "[a] lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial
arbitrator or mediator in matters which involve present or former clients. He
may serve in either capacity if he first discloses such present or former
relationships." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-20 (1980).
However, as the Comment to Rule '2.2 makes clear, Rule 2.2 was not intended
to govern attorneys who act as impartial mediators or as arbitrators between
parties who are not clients. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2
cmt. (1983); see 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:101.
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within certain limits. Not only do these rules provide a more concrete
set of guidelines, but they focus on protecting clients, in apparent
recognition that the "principal danger of [multiple] representation is
that one of the parties will take unfair advantage of the other,
knowingly or not. "30
III.

A.

MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION IN MARYLAND

The Relationship Between Model Rule 1.7 and Model Rule 2.2

Before choosing to represent multiple parties in a business transaction, a Maryland attorney must first consider the requirements
imposed by Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. While Rule 1.7 addresses
conflicts of interest generally, 31 and Rule 2.2 governs the limited
situation where an attorney acts as an intermediary between clients,32
neither rule explicitly outlines the situations where it should be
applied. As a result, determining each rule's limitations and applicability is difficult, particularly because both share several common
elements. 33 Therefore, by explaining each rule's requirements, this
Comment attempts to provide guidance to the practitioner, faced
with a multiple representation situation, as to which rule should be
applied.
Rule 1.7 applies in two types of conflict of interest situations:
(1) Where representation of one client "will be directly adverse" to
another client,34 and (2) where representation of a client "may be
materially limited" by an attorney's obligations to another client, "a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests."3s Although Rule 1.7
generally forbids representation where either type of conflict of
interest is present,36 an attorney may undertake the representation if
two conditions are satisfied. First, the attorney must "reasonably
30. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 39 (1982).
Contra Gillers, supra note 20, at 245 ("[The rulemakersJ have given us an
astonishingly parochial, self-aggrandizing document, which favors lawyers over
clients, other persons, and the administration of justice in almost every line,
paragraph, and provision that permits significant choice. ").
31. See supra note 23.
32. See supra note 26.
33. Both Rules 1.7 and 2.2 require that before multiple representation is undertaken,
an attorney must (i) determine that the representation will not adversely affect
either party; (2) fully explain the risks and advantages involved in the common
representation; and (3) obtain client consent. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rules 1.7 & 2.2 (1983).
34. [d. Rule 1.7(a).
35. [d. Rule 1.7(b). The comment to Rule 1.7 indicates that paragraph (b) applies
to multiple representation. [d. Rule 1.7 cmt.
36. [d. Rule 1.7(a) & (b).
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believe[] the representation [itself] will not be adversely affected. "37
Second, the attorney must obtain each client's consent. 38 Before
obtaining a client's consent, the attorney must disclose the "implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.' '39
The comment to Rule 1.7 illuminates the type of situations
covered by this Rule. Rule 1.7 is particularly applicable in the context
of estate planning and administration, and "where the clients are
generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of
interest among them."4O Rule 1.7 may also come into play when an
attorney is representing multiple buyers or multiple sellers. Because
Rule 1.7 imposes less strict consultation, evaluation, and withdrawal
requirements upon an attorney than its complement, Rule 2.2,41 Rule
1.7 is best followed when a potential conflict exists among the
multiple clients. 42
In a similar fashion, Rule 2.2 requires an attorney, before
undertaking intermediation, to first "consult[] with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the
advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client
privileges, and obtain[] each client's consent. "43 Second, the attorney
must "reasonably believe[] that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with the clients' best interests," that each client is capable
of making informed decisions, and "that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients" if the mUltiple
representation fails.44 Third, the attorney must "reasonably believe[]
that the common representation can be undertaken impartially and
without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to
any of the clients. "4S
Unlike Rule 1.7, once the intermediation has commenced, Rule
2.2 explicitly requires that the attorney "consult with each client"
about decisions to be made and disclose to each client any relevant
considerations that would aid each client in making an informed
decision. 46 Rule 2.2 also requires an attorney, during the intermediation process, to continually evaluate whether the conditions imposed
37. [d. Rule 1.7(b)(1).
38. [d. Rule 1. 7 (b)(2).
39. [d.
40. [d. Rule 1.7 cmt.
41. See id. Rule 2.2. The text of Rule 2.2 is set forth in supra note 26.
42. See id. Rule 1.7 cmt. Rule 1.7 applies to "common representation of persons
having similar interests" when the risk of causing an adverse effect on the
parties is minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are satisfied. [d.
43. [d. Rule 2.2(a)(I).
44. [d. Rule 2.2(a)(2).
45. [d. Rule 2.2(a)(3).
46. [d. Rule 2.2(b).
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by Rule 2.2(a) still exist. 47 If anyone of the conditions ceases to
exist, the attorney is obligated to withdraw. 48 Withdrawal is also
mandated "if any of the clients so requests. "49 Rule 2.2 further
imposes an additional restriction upon a withdrawing attorney; he
"shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that
was the subject of the intermediation."50
In contrast to Rule 1.7, Rule 2.2 presumes that an acute or
apparent conflict already exists. 51 Situations where Rule 2.2 demands
adherence include the representation of two or more existing clients
in the same transaction52 and where three individuals are seeking to
form a partnership.53 Choosing to follow either Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2
in a nonlitigation setting depends on the "proximity and degree" of
potential conflicts.54 "Relevant factors in determining whether there
is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of
the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the
functions being performed by the lawyer," the foreseeability of
potential conflicts exacerbating into real ones, and the likelihood of
prejudice to a client if an irreconcilable conflict does arise. 55

B.

Maryland Appellate Decisions

While an attorney must consult Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2 before
undertaking multiple representation in Maryland, the inquiry should
not stop with the Model Rules. Another important source governing
multiple representation in Maryland comes from Maryland's appellate
decisions. Although these appellate decisions consider the relationship
between mUltiple representation and Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 5105 of the Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility (Maryland
Code), they are instructive for several reasons. First, these appellate
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. Rule 2.2(c).
[d.
[d.

[d. (emphasis added).
51. "The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the
parties' mutual interests." [d. Rule 2.2 cmt.
52. See id. The comment to Rule 2.2 states that a
lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous
basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or
more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest,
arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or mediating a dispute between clients.
[d.

53. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:402.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1983).
55. [d.
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decisions highlight the pitfalls inherent in multiple representation.
Second, they identify the particular multiple representation situations
where an attorney has run afoul of the disciplinary rules, and suggest
how the situation might have been rectified by the attorney. Finally,
because these decisions interpret Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 5-105,
the predecessors to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2,56 they provide a framework within which to interpret the mandates of Rules 1.7 and 2.2.
1. Multiple Representation of Joint Ventures/Formation of
Business Entities

Both the Maryland court of appeals and the court of special
appeals have discussed the obligations of attorneys representing multiple parties in a joint venture. In Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v.
Comstock,57 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered
the propriety of Kaplan's multiple representation of both Crest
Investment and Mr. and Mrs. Comstock in an investment transaction
involving the development of an animal breeding business. 58 Kaplan
drafted a lending agreement conveying the Comstocks' farmland to
a new corporation, Comstock, Inc., with Crest Investment assuming
the Comstocks' outstanding,mortgage debt. 59 At this juncture, Kaplan
acknowledged that he represented the Comstocks and convinced Mr.
Comstock that hiring a separate attorney to review the agreement
was unnecessary.60 In the years following this initial agreement, the
joint venture continued to fail, prompting Kaplan to draft two
. subsequent agreements, each diminishing the Comstocks' interest in
their property and primary residence. 61 When foreclosure proceedings
were initiated against the Comstocks, they sought independent counsel
and sued Kaplan for malpractice. 62
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974).
[d. at 282-83, 327 A.2d at 894-95.
[d. at 286, 327 A.2d at 896.
[d. at 283-84, 327 A.2d at 895.
[d. at 287-90, 327 A.2d at 8%-98. At issue was the November 30, 1967
agreement that was the first of the two subsequent agreements drafted by
Kaplan. [d. at 287, 327 A.2d at 896. The November 30, 1967 agreement stated
that the farmland previously conveyed to Comstock, Inc. would "remain [its]
absolute and sole property," with the single exception that upon repayment of
the mortgage debt and repayment to Crest of all monies advanced to Comstock,
Inc., the dwelling and one acre would be reconveyed to the Comstocks for the
price of $1.00. [d. at 288,327 A.2d at 897. The November 30, 1967 agreement
was significantly different from the initial agreement drafted by Kaplan because
it extinguished Comstock, Inc.'s obligation, upon the satisfaction of all corporate and mortgage debt, to convey the balance of 97 acres to the Com stocks
for $1.00 or purchase it from the Comstocks for $5.00. [d.
62. [d. at 291, 327 A.2d at 899.
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The trial court found that (1) an attorney-client relationship had
existed between Kaplan and the Comstocks, and (2) Kaplan had acted
unfairly and had failed to make adequate disclosures. 63 In considering
whether the trial court had erred, the court of special appeals initially
noted that "[t]he instant case ... presents a situation substantially
different from a single transaction for the sale of realty."64 Rather,
"the conveyance of the land and improvements was a part of a
business promotion and all parties were ultimately interested in the
success of the enterprise. "65 According to the court, although a
conflict is not necessarily inherent in a joint venture situation, if the
" 'clients' involved can foreseeably have adverse economic interests
and if duality of representation is undertaken, it should be 'within
very narrow limits.' "66
After distinguishing the Comstocks' case from the typical real
estate transaction, the court outlined the legal principles governing
mUltiple representation in Maryland. The court stated that if multiple
representation occurs, adherence to the Maryland Code67 and "prudent concern for legitimate self-interest against possible liability dictate that full disclosure be made of the possible dangers involved
and that the legal representation be fundamentally fair to both
sides."68 In describing what is encompassed by full disclosure, the
Comstock court adopted the requirements of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey verbatim from its decision in In re Kamp.69
63. Id. at 293, 327 A.2d at 900. The trial court's decree stated the following:
It is patently clear that the defendant Kaplan, acting as attorney for
the [Comstocks] in this transaction, failed to make an adequate
disclosure to them of all relevant factors involved in their entering
into the agreement of November 30, 1967, with defendant Crest ...
and said agreement was obviously preferential to his clients, defendants
Crest and Comstock, Inc., and manifestly unfair to his clients, the
[Com stocks] .... Any lawyer should have known that this was not
a fair transaction and the failure to protect the plaintiffs and so advise
them while acting as their attorney is a complete breach of the fiduciary
relationship.
Id. at 298, 327 A.2d at 903 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 302, 327 A.2d at 905.
65.ld.
66. Id. at 303, 327 A.2d at 905.
67. The specific Disciplinary Rule under consideration was DR 5-105. Id. at 301,
327 A.2d at 904. See supra note 24 for the text of DR 5-105 of the Model
Code. Because Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 5-105 of the Maryland Code of
Professional Responsibility substantively mirror Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and
5-105 of the Model Code, this Comment only references the text of the Model
Code. Compare MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY DR 5-101
& DR 5-105 (1981) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY DR
5-101 & DR 5-105 (1980).
68. Crest, 23 Md. App. at 303, 327 A.2d at 905.
69. 194 A.2d 236 (N.J. 1963). The following is a recitation of facts from In re
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Full disclosure requires the attorney not only to inform the
prospective client of the attorney's relationship to the seller,
but also to explain in detail the pitfalls that may arise in
the course of the transaction which would make it desirable
that the buyer have independent counsel. The full significance of the representation of conflicting interests should
be disclosed to the client so that he may make an intelligent
decision before giving his consent. If the attorney cannot
properly represent the buyer in all aspects of the transaction
because of his relationship to the seller, full disclosure
requires that he inform the buyer of the limited scope of
his intended representation of the buyer's interests and point
out the advantages of the buyer's retaining independent
counse1. 70
Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to void
the various transactions between the Comstocks and Crest Investment. 71 Although the court of special appeals refused to hold that

Kamp: Iri 1962 Mrs. Cronk and Staben Custom Built Homes, Inc. (Staben),
entered into a contract, whereby Mrs. Cronk agreed to purchase a home that
was to be built by Staben. Id. at 238. The contract required Mrs. Cronk to
make a $2,000 down payment at the execution of the contract, and then make
periodic payments that coincided with the construction progress of the house.
Id. In addition, the contract stated that all parties agreed that attorney Daniel
Kamp would handle the closing of title. Id. Kamp first received notice of the
sale to Mrs. Cronk when Stab en sent him a copy of the executed contract. Id.
After paying Staben approximately $10,500, Mrs. Cronk hired her own
attorney, Richard Huckin. Id. Huckin tried to conduct a title search of the
property but was unable to locate the property with sufficient accuracy. Id.
Huckin then contacted Kamp about his unsuccessful title search. Id. Kamp
responded to Huckin's inquiry by telling him that Mrs. Cronk had signed the
contract agreeing to Kamp's representation, and that Kamp had every intention
of making Mrs. Cronk pay his fee. Id. Huckin then informed Kamp that "he
considered such arrangement improper and would report his actions to the
ethics committee if he continued to maintain his present position." Id. A
complaint against Kamp was filed·with the Bergen County Ethics and Grievance
Committee. Id.
At trial, Kamp testified that he believed that the contract between Mrs. Cronk
and Staben created an attorney-client relationship between himself and Mrs.
Cronk. Id. Kamp admitted, however, that he never met with Mrs. Cronk, nor
did he do anything to protect her interests. Id. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey concluded that the facts "clearly show[ed) a violation" of the disciplinary
rules. Id. at 239. According to the supreme court, because "[a) conflict of
interest is inherent in the relationship of buyer and seller," representation is
improper unless the attorney makes a full disclosure and receives client consent.
Id. at 240. The supreme court unanimously reprimanded Kamp. Id. at 242-43.
70. Crest, 23 Md. App. at 303, 327 A.2d at 905 (quoting In re Kamp, 194 A.2d
236, 240 (N.J. 1963».
71. Id. at 307, 327 A.2d at 907. The court stated that

1993]

Representing Multiple Parties

193

multiple representation in a business transaction is a per se violation
of the Maryland Code, it did conclude the following: "This is rather
a situation where an attorney has chosen to act for both sides (with
the knowledge of both sides) in a business transaction-an undertaking which is indeed fraught with serious problems and potentially
dire consequences and should generally be avoided."12
Similarly, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert,13 the court of
appeals subscribed to the court of special appeals' reasoning in Crest
regarding mUltiple representation under the Maryland Code. 14 Specifically, the court of appeals agreed with the court of special appeals
that when multiple representation does occur, full disclosure, as
defined in Crest, must be made regarding the possible dangers
involved, and the representation itself must "be fundamentally fair
to both sides. "15 Recent decisions in Maryland affirm the Crest and
Atlantic Richfield requirement of full disclosure by attorneys undertaking mUltiple representation. 16
In making a full disclosure to his clients, the attorney should
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the common representation. When explaining the advantages, the attorney should inform
all parties that they have both time and money to save; in addition,
multiple representation may also have the effect of neutralizing
conflicts that might be exacerbated if two more attorneys were added
Mr. and Mrs. Comstock were entitled to more, at the hands of Mr.
Kaplan, than the advice that foreclosure was inevitable and, in effect,
that their capitulation to the terms of the November 30, 1967 agreement was their only alternative to financial ruin. Indeed, it is clear
beyond any reasonable doubt that Mr. Kaplan at that point should
have urged that the Com stocks engage independent counsel. His failure
to do so and his failure to make adequate disclosure compel a
declaration that the November, 1967 agreement was void.
Id.
72. Id. at 300, 327 A.2d at 904.
73. 295 Md. 347, 456 A.2d 20 (1983).
74. Id. at 355-56, 456 A.2d at 24-25. Disciplinary Rules 5-101(A) and 5-105(A)(C) were under consideration in Atlantic Richfield. Id. at 356, 456 A.2d at 25;
see supra note 24 for the text of these disciplinary rules.
75. Id. at 356, 456 A.2d at 24. The court of appeals, quoting the court of special
appeals, also adopted the language from In re Kamp verbatim. Id. at 356, 456
A.2d at 24-25.
76. See Walton v. Davy, 86 Md. App. 275, 286-88, 586 A.2d 760, 765-67, cert.
denied, 323 Md. 309, 593 A.2d 669 (1991) (discussing, in the estate context,
that a transaction will not be set aside if after full disclosure a client has
voluntarily and knowingly consented to the multiple representation); Blum v.
Blum, 59 Md. App. 584, 599-601, 477 A.2d 289, 296-97 (1984) (stating that
although multiple representation is inappropriate in the domestic relations
context, if undertaken, an attorney must nevertheless "disclose to the parties
the possible ramifications of his [multiple] representation and their respective
rights").
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to the equation. On the other hand, the attorney should also explain
that if the multiple representation fails, each person will need to hire
a separate attorney, resulting in increased costs and loss of valuable
time.
In addition, the attorney should explain to all parties that client
confidences normally protected under Rule 1.6 must be shared among
all clients. 77 Therefore, all clients are forbidden from "keeping secrets. " The attorney should stress that when one of the clients fails
to disclose all pertinent information, it directly affects everyone else's
ability to make informed decisions. 78 The attorney should emphasize
that when decisions are made, all parties should be present. In the
event that the former is not possible, the persons not present at a
meeting will be kept up to date by the attorney. The attorney should
explain that if anyone of the parties attempt an ex parte conversation,
he must be aware that this information will be disclosed to the
remaining parties. In the event that anyone of them refuses to share
all information, then they must be aware that the attorney will
terminate the representation and discontinue any involvement in the
transaction.
2.

Multiple Representation in Real Estate Transactions

Although no Maryland case appears to have considered the
propriety of multiple representation where the attorney has represented both clients in the past, several Maryland cases have addressed
various aspects of multiple representation in real estate transactions.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the conflict of interest
inherent in the lender/mortgagee-borrower/mortgagor relationship in
Flaherty v. Weinberg. 79 The court of appeals offered the following
77. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:202. After discussing confidentiality, Hazard and Hodes make the following comment: "Perhaps more
important, the evidentiary attorney-client privilege does not apply to parties
who have shared a lawyer, so that if the parties were later to litigate against
each other over the subject of the failed mediation, the lawyer would be called
and forced to testify as a witness." [d.
78. Martin, supra note 4, at 20.
79. 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985). In 1977, Mr. and Mrs. Flaherty entered
into a contract of sale to purchase a home in Frederick. [d. at 132, 492 A.2d
at 626. The Flahertys financed their purchase by securing a mortgage loan
through First Federal Savings and Loan Association (First Federal). [d. During
the settlement, First Federal was represented by the law firm Weinberg, Michel
and Sterns (Weinberg); the Flahertys, on the other hand, did not retain a
separate attorney. [d. However, Weinberg assured the Flahertys that they were
purchasing the property described in the contract of sale, and that this property
contained a house and a well. [d. The Flahertys did not pay Weinberg any
fees, in fact, Weinberg paid for the 1976 survey of the property. [d. at 132,
492 A.2d at 626.
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observations. One area where potential conflicts exist involves the
respective title requirements of the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 80
The mortgagee desires that the title not be impaired to the extent
that indebtedness exceeds the value of the security in the property. 81
In contrast, "the mortgagor wants assurances of maximum enjoyment
of the property and freedom from post-settlement claims by third
parties. "82 Despite this apparent conflict, the court failed to address
whether an attorney, giving the appropriate disclosures in accordance
with the Maryland Code, could overcome this type of conflict,
because it found that the facts did not give rise to an inference that
a conflict existed between the Flahertys and First Federal's multiple
use of the same attorney. 83
The court of appeals also has considered multiple representation
of sellers, purchasers, and mortgagees in the context of a disciplinary
proceeding against an attorney. In Attorney Grievance Commission
v. Lockhart,84 Lockhart, the attorney, was charged with violating
several Disciplinary Rules under the Maryland Code, including Disciplinary Rules 5-105(B) and 5-105(C).8~ Lockhart had represented
the sellers, Crystal Beach Manor, Inc., and its parent corporation,
Extens Associates, various purchasers, and the mortgagees. 86 As
settlements on the various properties occurred, Lockhart failed to
procure releases of existing liens on the properties; therefore, the
subsequent title insurance purchased by the buyers and the mortgagees
did not reflect that the land conveyed was subject to these existing
deeds of trust. 87
The court of appeals accepted the trial court's conclusion that
DR 5-105(B) and DR 5-105(C) were violated because Lockhart's
loyalty was to Extens, and such loyalty "adversely affected the
exercise of his independent professional judgment in [sic] behalf of
. In 1982, after obtaining another survey of their property, the Flahertys
discovered that their swimming pool, well, and driveway were situated upon
their neighbor's property. [d. at 132-33, 492 A.2d at 626. As a result, the
F1ahertys sued Weinberg and the 1976 surveyor for negligence and breach of
warranty. [d. at 133, 492 A.2d at 626. With respect to the negligence claim
asserted against Weinberg, the court of appeals held that the trial court had
erred in sustaining Weinberg's demurrer because the facts alleged that the
Flahertys were the intended beneficiaries of Weinberg'S representation of First
Federal. [d. at 138-39, 492 A.2d at 629-30.
80. [d. at 138, 492 A.2d at 629.
81. [d.
82. [d.
83. [d.
84. 285 Md. 586, 403 A.2d 1241 (1979).
85. ld. at 587, 403 A.2d at 1241. For the text of DR 5-105(B)-(C), see supra note
24.
86. [d. at 590, 403 A.2d at 1243.
87. [d.
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the purchasers. "88 The court set forth the portion of the trial judge's
opinion discussing the conflict of interest inherent in multiple representation in real estate transactions. 89 Specifically, quoting the trial
judge's opinion, the court expressed the following opinion: " 'Clearly
it would be improper ... for an attorney to represent both the
purchaser and the seller, or the purchaser and the lender, without
full disclosure of the facts and consent by all parties.' "90
Although in this case the court suspended Lockhart for one
year,91 it did express a tolerance for multiple representation in real
estate contexts. 92 The court stated:
88. Id. at 591-92, 403 A.2d at 1244.
89. Id. at 595 n.6, 403 A.2d at 1245 n.6. In his OpinIOn, Judge Rasin took
" 'judicial notice of the practice in the Second Judicial Circuit [of Maryland]
that it is not unusual for the same attorney to represent the seller, purchaser,
and mortgagee in a real estate transaction context.' " Id. The Lockhart court
then quoted liberally from Annotation, Attorney and Client: Conflict oj Interest
in Real-Estate Closing Situations, 68 A.L.R.3D 967, 970 (1976):
A problem for the attorney, and for representatives of the bar
attempting to provide standards for guidance of the legal profession
in this area, is that to require independent representation of all
potentially conflicting interests 'would be impractical, requiring duplication of effort and greater expense on the part of individual clients,
and a consequent increased cost to the public for legal services in
real-estate transactions. On the other hand, to permit the representation of conflicting interests in the name of efficiency or economic
necessity would interfere with the attorney-client relationship and with
a client's right to expect an attorney to represent his interests to the
fullest extent permitted by law.
Lockhart, 285 Md. at 595 n.6, 403 A.2d at 1245 n.6.
90. Id. (quoting ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. C-472 (1961».
91. Id. at 597, 403 A.2d at 1247.
92. Other cases from the Court of Appeals of Maryland have expressed a similar
view that mUltiple representation, with the appropriate disclosures and fairness
to all parties involved, can be ethical in real estate transactions. See Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Collins, 295 Md. 532, 553-56, 457 A.2d 1134, 1145-46
(1983) (suspending Collins for one year for failing, while representing both the
buyer and seller, to advise the former of his options and to include in the
contract a noncompetition clause); Busey v. Perkins, 168 Md. 19, 176 A. 474
(1935) (refusing to set aside the mortgage because the attorney had disclosed
each party's respective rights and obligations).
In a recent decision, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
Homa, the attorney who represented the seller, Friendly, Inc., and the buyer,
P IT Ltd., Inc. in connection with the sale of mobile parks, was liable to the
seller in fraud. Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, Inc., 93 Md. App. 337, 344,
350, 612 A.2d 322, 325, 328 (1992), cert. granted, 329 Md. 168, 617 A.2d
1085 (1993). According to the court of special appeals, when an attorney
represents multiple parties in a real estate transaction, "if an attorney's
relationship with the buyer interferes with his ability to represent the seller,
the attorney must inform the seller." Id. at 347-48, 612 A.2d at 327. In this
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Settlement lawyers in effect representing all interests, as did
Lockhart, must recognize that they have a special duty to
all parties to the settlement. This duty includes prompt
obtention of appropriate releases of liens. It also includes
prompt and proper disbursement of all funds passing through
their hands. 93
A review of Maryland's relevant case law regarding multiple
representation in business transactions indicates that the courts will
permit multiple representation, provided that (1) the attorney makes
a full disclosure to all clients, and (2) the representation is fundamentally fair. The type of full disclosure required by the Maryland
courts mirrors the disclosure requirements codified in Model Rules
1.7 and 2.2,94 and provides a noteworthy example of what full
disclosure mandates.
In contrast to the explicit provisions of Model Rules 1.7 and
2.2, the Maryland courts will also judge whether the attorney's
conduct .in the transaction, and any resulting agreements, were
fundamentally fair to all parties involved. By stressing that the
attorney is obligated to act fairly in relation to all parties, the
Maryland courts seem to dispel any notion that mUltiple representation, in accordance with the disciplinary rules, can be equated with
the attorney acting as a scrivener for the parties. 9 ' On the contrary,
by analyzing the agreement or transaction in terms of whether it
was fair, the Maryland courts refuse to condone one-sided representation by the attorney. This refusal to recognize a one-sided agreement or transaction would likely translate into a rejection by the
Maryland courts of the defense that the attorney was merely "making
legal" the parties' independent agreement. To permit an attorney to

case, Homa's representation of the sellers was materially affected by his
representation of the buyers because (1) he had a financial interest in PIT
Ltd., and (2) he knew that the owner of PIT Ltd. would not assume Friendly's
outstanding mortgage upon the consummation of the transaction. [d. at 350,
612 A.2d at 328. Therefore, because Homa did not disclose either his financial
ties with the buyer or his knowledge with respect to the assumption of the
mortgages prior to undertaking the'representation, he breached his fiduciary
duty to the sellers, [d. As a result, the court of special appeals upheld the trial
court's finding that Homa's failure to make the appropriate disclosures made
him liable to the sellers in fraud. [d.
93. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 597, 403 A.2d 1241,
1247 (1979).
94. Compare supra notes 23·26 with notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Blum v. Blum, S9 Md. App. 584, 601, 477 A.2d 289, 297 (1984)
("Although counsel may have believed that he was merely acting as a 'scribe'
with regard to the Blum's separation agreement, ... the very least counsel
should have done was disclose to the parties the possible ramifications of his
dual representation and their respective rights. ").
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successfully raise this defense would result in an abrogation of the
attorney's fiduciary obligation, which the Maryland courts have
consistently recognized. 96
IV. OTHER STATE APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE
REPRESENTATION

A. Multiple Representation in Joint Ventures/Formation oj
Business Entities
Several states have addressed the propriety of multiple representation in the context of joint ventures and the formation of business
entities. Oregon and Washington, for example, have considered
whether multiple representation is appropriate in the context of joint
ventures. In an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court
of Oregon confronted the situation where one attorney represented
multiple investors interested in purchasing corporate stock. 97 Attempting to exonerate himself from disciplinary action, Moore argued that
"he was representing the group purchasing Pinnacle Packing and not
the individuals.' '98
The court rejected Moore's defense because his testimony conflicted with his conduct in the situation. 99 The court held that Moore
had violated Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code, by failing
"to make full disclosure" and to receive the consent of all the parties
involved in the transaction. loo However, the court did not rule out
the possible validity of this defense should it be raised in a future
case.10 1
96. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert, 295 Md. 347, 353-55, 456 A.2d 20, 23-

97.
~8.

99.

100.
101.

24 (1983); Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, Inc., 93 Md. App. 337, 346-47,
612 A.2d 322, 328-29 (1992), cert. granted, 329 Md. 168,617 A.2d 1085 (1993).
In re Moore, 703 P.2d 961, 962 (Or. 1985).
Id. at 965. Apparently, Moore's defense was an application of the principle
of "lawyer for the situation." See generally infra part V.A. (defining the
"Lawyering for the Situation" model).
Moore, 703 P.2d at 965. The Disciplinary Review Board stated "that what
[Moore] apparently did in this case was 'follow the money.' " Id.
Id.
Id. In addressing Moore's defense that he was representing the group and not
the individuals, the court stated the following:
Moore's letter of January II, 1980, claiming to represent only the
group purchasing Pinnacle Packing came too late. The damage was
already done. Which group was Moore representing-Vanya Corporation or JJ & L Properties?
[Disciplinary Rule] 5-105(C) does not apply to this situation because
Moore did not make a "full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment
on behalf of each client." There was no consent by [the clients] to
Moore's multiple representation.
Id.
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The Supreme Court of Washington confronted an analogous
situation in Eriks v. Denver.l02 The court dealt with the propriety of
Denver's multiple representation of promoters and investors in a tax
shelter arrangement. I03 The court held that Denver violated Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code, by failing (1) to discuss any
potential conflicts of interest with his investor clients and (2) "to
explain any circumstances that might [have] cause[d] a client to doubt
[his] 10yalty."I04 By failing to disclose the potential conflict that
existed with his investor clients and to discuss the "dangers inherent
in multiple representation," the court stated that Denver also violated
his duty of loyalty to his investor clients. lOS
Had Denver only represented the investors, he could have advised
them that the IRS would audit each client's return and would
probably disallow the tax credits and deductions associated with the
tax scheme. 106 In addition, he could have informed his investor clients
that if the IRS disallowed the tax credits, they could potentially
assert claims against the promoters. I07 Instead, when the conflict
actually developed, Denver advised his investor clients to seek independent counsel. 108 According to the court, "the evil [that Disciplinary
Rule 5-105 was] designed to prevent actually came about in this
case." 109
The Supreme Court of Arizona considered the propriety of one
attorney representing a group of individuals seeking to form a

102. 824 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1992).
103. [d. at 1208-09. In 1977, the promoters started selling investments in master
sound recordings as tax shelters. [d. at 1209. Because the promoters knew that
the IRS would challenge the tax credits and deductions taken by the investors,
they formed a trust fund to provide monies for a joint legal defense for the
investors and promoters in future cases brought by the IRS against them. [d.
The promoters then hired Denver to represent the investors and promoters who
had contributed to the trust fund. [d.
Before undertaking the multiple representation, Denver knew that the IRS
was categorically denying tax credits and deductions based upon investments
in master sound recordings. [d. Denver also was confident that the IRS would
disallow the investors' credits and deductions. [d. In addition, Denver knew
that the investors might have potential civil claims against the promoters. [d.
Denver undertook the multiple representation after discussing his knowledge
about the IRS's tax policies with his promoters, but not with the investors.
[d.
104. [d. at
105. [d. at
106. [d. at
107. [d.
108. [d. at
109. [d.

1212.
1211-12.
1212.
1211.
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business entity in In re Ireland. llo In Ireland, while representing a
group of incorporators, Ireland also represented one of them in a
pending domestic lawsuit, the outcome of which would affect the
assets of the newly formed corporation. 11 I Not only did Ireland fail
to disclose this domestic representation to the remaining incorporators, but he also failed to disclose this client's subsequent misuse of
corporate funds. 1I2 Not surprisingly, the court held that the attorney
had violated the Model Code by ignoring the full disclosure requirements. 113 By negative implication, the court would appear to permit
multiple representation in this type of situation, provided that full
disclosure had occurred.
The common theme emerging from these three examples is that
the representation of multiple parties in a joint venture or in the
formation of a business entity can be ethically undertaken. In each
of the preceding cases, the attorneys' conduct warranted sanctioning
because of a failure to fully disclose possible conflicts. Had each
attorney, in accordance with the Model Rules or the Model Code,
explained to his respective clients the potential conflicts inherent in
multiple representation and obtained their consent, he probably would
not have been sanctioned.

B.

Multiple Representation oj Existing Clients

A few jurisdictions have addressed the mUltiple representation
of existing clients. In considering whether an undisclosed law firm
may represent multiple claimants to a fund being distributed by a
copyright tribunal, the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of
Columbia Bar (D.C. Committee) permitted multiple representation
within the strict confines of Rule 2.2.114 Although the law firm had
formerly represented two parties before a copyright tribunal, the
D.C. Committee advised that the law firm could represent these same
two parties and a third party on the following conditions:
1) [T]he firm fully discloses the risks and benefits of joint
representation to all the clients, including a frank discussion
of the implications of the rules on conflicts with former
clients and confidentiality; 2) the firm obtains consent of
each client to the representation; and 3) the firm does not
110.
111.
112.
113.

706 P.2d 352 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 358; see also In re Kali, 569 P.2d 227 (Ariz. 1977) (en banc) (suspending
attorney for the failure to reveal his multiple representation to two clients for
whom he had arranged a loan transaction).
114. Legal Ethics Comm. of D.C. Bar, Formal Op. 217 (1991), summarized in THE
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PRO-
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advocate for anyone of the clients in negotiations with the
other clients as to the allocation of any award"l~
Similarly, relying upon the mandates of Rule 2.2, the Connecticut
Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics (Connecticut Committee) advised an undisclosed law firm that it could draft a sales
contract between two existing clients. 1l6 The Connecticut Committee
concluded that Rule 2.2117 governed the transaction because·
(1) ... both the small business and the non-profit corporation had been represented over a period of time by the
firm; (2) . . . both the small business and the non-profit
corporation appear to want the law firm to perform certain
services for their common interest; (3) . . . the parties will
establish the price and other terms of the sale without the
FESSIONAL CONDUCT 1 1001:2301 (1991) [hereinafter D.C. Bar, Formal Gp.
217]. Ethics opinions are issued by the ABA and committees from each state's
bar association at the request of an attorney faced with a particular ethical
dilemma. See generally 1 to 4 NAT'L RPTR. ON LEGAL ETHICS (U. Publications
of Am. 1993) (compiling various ethics opinions from each state). These ethics
opinions are therefore only advisory in nature. Although the value of a
particular ethics opinion will vary from state to state, ethics opinions generally
serve to provide guidance to state courts when considering the propriety of an
individual attorney's conduct, see, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 8, at 86, and are
often cited as persuasive authority, see, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 595 n.6, 403 A.2d 1241, 1245 n.6 (1979).
115. D.C. Bar, Formal Op. 217, supra note 114, 1 1001:2301.
116. Connecticut Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 91-14
(1991), summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7 Current Rep., No. 23, at 385
(Dec. 18, 1991). The Committee was presented with the following facts:
A law firm had for many years represented a small business and a
non-profit corporation. One of the partners of the firm has recently
been elected president of the non-profit corporation. The non-profit
corporation has begun negotiations to acquire the small business. No
one in the firm will participate in the negotiations to establish the
terms and purchase price of any sale between the parties. The partner
who is president of the corporation will abstain from participation in
any discussion involving the transaction and from any vote taken.
[d.

117. The Committee initially inquired whether Model Rule 1.7 or Model Rule 2.2
applied to the situation. [d. The Committee concluded that Rule 1.7 did not
apply and stated the following:
It does not appear that the representation of the small business by
the law firm will be "directly adverse" to the representation of the
non-profit corporation as required for the applicability of Rule 1.7.
The deal will have been made and the firm will act only to prepare
an agreement to incorporate the terms and to close the transaction.
Therefore, the firm is not engaged by either party to take a position
adverse to the other.
[d.
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participation of anyone in the law firm; and (4) . . . the
participation of the firm may be for the mutual benefit of
both parties by expediting the transaction and saving legal
expenses. liS
According to the Connecticut Committee, it would permit the multiple representation on this limited basis if the law firm could satisfy
each requirement of Rule 2.2.119
The California District Court of Appeals also addressed the
representation of existing clients in Blevin v. Mayfield. 120 In Blevin,
Weis, the attorney, drafted a deed for two clients who had already
agreed upon the essential terms of the conveyance. 121 Although the
attorney had a prior attorney-client relationship with both clients,
the court succinctly concluded that because the terms of the agreement
had already been reached, "the only service performed by Mr. Weis
was that of a scrivener."I22 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial
court's holding that the evidence did not justify the cancellation of
the deed.123
These three preceding examples generally demonstrate that the
mUltiple representation of existing clients can occur without the
attorney violating the disciplinary rules. Several common features
distinguish, however, the mUltiple representation of existing clients
from the mUltiple representation of parties participating in a joint
venture or forming a business entity. First, unlike the previously
discussed cases on multiple representation of parties participating in
a joint venture or forming a business entity, these three examples
stress that multiple representation is appropriate where the parties
have agreed in advance upon all the essential terms. Therefore, these
118. Id.
119. Id. For the requirements of Rule 2.2, see supra note 26.
120. 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
121. Id. at 883. The case was brought as an action by the executor, Blevin, and
executrix, Smith, to cancel a deed that the decedent, Howlett, executed in
favor of Mayfield nine days before his death. Id. at 882-83. The plaintiffs
sought to cancel the deed on the grounds of incapacity, fraud, and undue
influence. Id. at 883. The decedent summoned Mayfield to his home, proposing
that he sell her 80 acres of property for $5,000. Id. The decedent realized that
the property had a greater value than his asking price. Id. Attorney Weis
drafted the deed only after satisfying himself that the decedent was competent.
Id. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred by refusing to
set aside the deed drafted by Weis, because his prior relationship with both
the decedent and Mayfield constituted an impermissible conflict of interest. Id.
at 884.
122. Id.; see also Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (Idaho
1978) (adopting the view that "if the parties have already agreed on the basic
terms of the agreement and the attorney acts primarily as a 'scrivener' /Ie may
normally represent both parties after obtaining their consent").
123. Blevin, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 882, 884.
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examples seem to indicate that the attorney may not serve as an
"advocate" for the parties, but rather may only serve as a "scrivener" for the parties.
Second, two of the three examples advocated a strict compliance
with Rule 2.2 that, at a minimum, requires full disclosure, client
consent, and attorney evaluation prior to and during the representation. In contrast to the varying application of Rules 1.7 and 2.2
to the mUltiple representation of parties participating in a joint
venture or forming a business entity, two of these three examples
uniformly apply Rule 2.2. Therefore, according to these two examples, Rule 2.2, which governs intermediaries, should be followed
when an attorney confronts the mUltiple representation of existing
clients. Based upon these three examples, one can conclude that when
undertaking the mUltiple representation of existing clients, an attorney
(1) must be more careful to follow Rule 2.2 mandates and (2) should
assume a less active role in the negotiations between' the parties.
C.

Multiple Representation in Real Estate Transactions

1. Unique Approaches to Multiple Representation in Real Estate
Transactions

Many states permit the mUltiple representation of buyers and
sellers, or buyers and lenders, or a combination of all three, provided
that full disclosure and consent have been obtained pursuant to either
the Model Code or Model Rules. l24 Of those states permitting multiple

124. See Holley v. Jackson, 158 A.2d 803, 808 (Del. Ch. 1959) (holding that when
an attorney acts for both parties in a real estate closing, he has a particular
duty to disclose any potential conflicts and to ensure the protection of all
parties); Florida Bar v. Teitelman, 261 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1972) (stating
that where a seller is unrepresented at closing, an attorney for the buyer or
lender may not charge the seller absent (1) the creation of an attorney-client
relationship, (2) full disclosure, and (3) client consent to the representation and
the amount of the fee); State v. Callahan, 652 P.2d 708, 709, 713 (Kan. 1982)
(suspending attorney who represented a buyer and seller because he failed to
disclose his business ties to the buyer according to DR 5-105); In re Dolan,
384 A.2d 1076, 1080 (N.J. 1978) (requiring full disclosure before an attorney
undertakes representation of both the buyer and the seller, or the financing
party and the buyer); In re Kamp, 194 A.2d 236, 240-41 (N.J. 1963) (same);
In re Conduct of Samuels & Weiner, 674 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Or. 1983) (stating
that "[s)ince at least 1975, it has been clear that it is not proper for a lawyer
to represent both the buyer and the seller in a real property transaction in the
absence of express consent after full disclosure"); Dillard v. Broyles, 633
S. W.2d 636, 642-43 (Tx. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that an attorney may represent
both the buyer and the seller after he has disclosed potential conflicts and
obtained the parties' consent), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); In re Nelson,
332 N.W.2d 811, 812 (Wis. 1983) (suspending an attorney who represented the
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representation in real estate transactions, some have imposed additional requirements beyond those listed in the Model Code or Model
Rules, or have offered different rationales for the acceptance of
mUltiple representation. Because these states have chosen a unique
approach to multiple representation in real estate transactions, each
approach is discussed separately.
The West Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics (West
Virginia Committee) addressed multiple representation in a host of
residential real estate transactions because of a perceived "need
among members of the state bar for a formal opinion. "125 In addressing the representation of buyers and lenders, the West Virginia
Committee stated that "because of the nature of the real estate
market in this state it is appropriate for a lawyer to represent both
buyer and lender if certain conditions are met. "126 Before undertaking
the representation, the attorney must first conclude that (1) "no
actual conflict of interest" exists and (2) the parties can be competently served. 127 Second, the attorney must make a full disclosure in
writing and receive written consent from the parties. l28 Third, in the
event a dispute develops, the attorney is barred from representing
either party in litigation. 129
The West Virginia Committee next discussed the representation
of buyers and sellers, acknowledging that this situation is "less likely"

125.

126.

127.
128.

129.

buyer and the seller in negotiations for the sale of a condominium, for his
failure to disclose his financial ties to seller and seller's precarious financial
position); see generally Jeb C. Sanford, Ethical, Statutory and Regulatory
Conflicts of Interest in Real Estate Transactions, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 79, 8890 (1985) (discussing multiple representation of lender and borrower or buyer
and seller in a single real estate transaction).
West Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 89-1 (1989),
summarized in THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6 Current Rep., No.6, at 117 (Apr. 25,
1990).
Id. In describing the West Virginia real estate market, the Committee stated
the following:
Because this is a small, somewhat rural state, real estate transactions
between private individuals tend to be handled by one attorney.
Frequently there is no clarification as to whom this attorney represents.
Conflict questions cannot be resolved, however, without determining
on whose behalf the lawyer is acting.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Committee stated that "a lawyer may not be a party to a real estate
transaction with a client without the written informed consent of the client."
Id.
Id. However, the Committee commented that an attorney may represent the
buyer or lender, or both, in subsequent negotiations according to the requirements of Rule 2.2. Id.
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to occur. 130 The West Virginia Committee remarked: "While there is
no absolute ban on a lawyer's representation of both [the] buyer and
seller, the lawyer must be very cautious in undertaking such a
representation." 131 The attorney must provide the client with a written
disclosure sheet explaining that the attorney-client privilege cannot
exist.132 Similar to the representation of buyers and lenders, the
attorney must withdraw if a conflict develops, and he cannot represent either the buyer or seller in subsequent litigation. 133
Finally, the West Virginia Committee addressed "the unusual
case" where the attorney is asked to represent the buyer, lender, and
seller. 134 In addition to written disclosure, written consent or the
clients, and compliance with Rule 2.2, the attorney must clarify "at
the outset of the transaction whose interests he is representing." 13S
By requiring written disclosure and consent in all multiple representation situations, the West Virginia Committee adds an additional
requirement to Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2. In addition, the West
Virginia Committee appears to accept multiple representation more
readily because of the realities of the real estate market in West
Virginia-a justification not previously offered as to why multiple
representation should be sanctioned.
Relying on Rule 1.7 instead of Rule 2.2, the Committee on
Professional Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Association (Illinois
Committee) advised that multiple representation is permissible in real
estate transactions. 136 Under the Illinois Committee's interpretation
of Rule 1.7, an attorney may draft documents for the lender and
also represent the buyer, provided that the attorney "continuously
monitor[s]" the representation. 137 "[I]f the lawyer believes that one
representation is adversely affecting the other, he must withdraw
from each representation." 138
Significantly, the Illinois Committee recognized an additional
limitation: If the attorney or his law firm serves as general counsel
to the lending institution in a real estate transaction, neither the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 90-31 (1990). summarized in THE BUREAU
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 1 1001:3004 (1991).
137. [d.
138. [d. The Committee stated that "[i]nitial disclosure must include the possible
necessity of subsequent withdrawal." [d. In addition, the attorney may not
represent either the buyer or the lender in a subsequent foreclosure or bankruptcy proceeding in cases where the lender has a security interest. [d.
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attorney nor the law firm may represent the buyer for several
reasons.139 First. representation of the buyer "may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to the lender." 140 Second.
"even after full disclosure and client consent the lawyer cannot
'reasonably believe' that the representation of the buyer will not be
adversely affected. ttl41 Finally. the attorney "has a fiduciary duty to
that institution and may have a possible personal interest therein. tt 142
In a similar vein. the Massachusetts Bar Association Ethics
Committee (Massachusetts Committee) recommended that the multiple representation of a borrower/buyer and mortgage lender in the
same real estate purchase can be ethical. 143 Although the Massachusetts Committee noted that the interests of the parties are "likely to
be diverse regarding the substantive contents of the mortgage documents." prior to undertaking joint representation. the lawyer should
review all documents for any existing or possible conflicts.l44 Additionally. the lawyer should receive. preferably in writing. the informed
consent of the borrower and mortgage lender .145 Finally. if a conflict
or a dispute should occur. the attorney is bound to withdraw from
.
representing either party. 146
The Massachusetts Committee next advised attorneys about the
relationship between confidentiality and multiple representation:
Unless otherwise agreed. multiple representation waives
the confidentiality obligation between the borrower and the
lender. and both clients should be so advised. A lawyer who
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1990-3 (1990), summarized in
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6 Current Rep., No. 13, at 259 (Aug. 1, 1990)
[hereinafter Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1990-3J. The Committee analyzed this transaction according to DR 5-105(C). See supra note 24
for the full text of DR 5-105(C).
144. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1990-3, supra note 143, at 259.
According to the Committee, when reviewing loan documents an attorney
should be alerted to actual or potential conflicts if the documents contain
"oppressive, ambiguous, or unusual provisions." [d.
145. [d. The Committee stated that
[tJhe lawyer should advise the borrower on the important terms of
the mortgage and note, as well as on the contract that defines the
lender's obligations to fund the mortgage loan, especially with respect
to conditions imposed by the lender. A clearly written, unambiguous
mortgage commitment that delineates the rights of the lender and
borrower greatly reduces any risk of actual conflict.
[d.
146. [d.
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acquires knowledge about either client relevant to the transaction, such as uncertain financial condition or source of
funds, or misstatements, omissions, or errors in the mortgage application or the documents to be signed at closing,
is required to disclose it to the other client. 147
In addition, the Massachusetts Committee suggested that potential
conflicts could be prevented from occurring at the closing if the
attorney included a provision in the purchase and sales agreement to
the effect that the "seller will provide title acceptable to the buyer's
mortgage lender or that any questions of title will be settled by
reference to ascertainable standards." 148
Like Massachusetts, the South Carolina Bar Association (Bar
Association) advised that the mUltiple representation of lenders and
borrowers in real estate transactions can occur without violating the
disciplinary rules. The Bar Association offered a different rationale
for its position, however. In its advisory opinion, the Bar Association
was presented with the following factual scenario, which is similar
to that presented in Act I, Scene 3:
Law Firm frequently represents Lender in a wide range of
matters. Law Firm also represents various Borrowers from
time to time in real estate loan closings in which Lender is
the lending party. In these transactions, Law Firm considers
itself to be representing both Lender and Borrower; however, Law Firm considers its primary obligation to the
Lender. 149
Based upon these facts, the Bar Association concluded that "[a]
conflict does not necessarily exist where one attorney represents the
interests of more than one party in a loan closing. "ISO Rather than
relying on Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2 for justification, the Bar Association turned instead to Model Rules 1.2(c) and 1.9(a).lsl Rule 1.2(c)
provides that an attorney "may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation. "152 In light of Rule.
1.2, the Bar Association stated that
[i]n order to preserve a continuing relationship with and
loyalty to Lender, Law Firm prior to representing Borrower
in a loan transaction may request that Borrower sign a
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. South Carolina Advisory Op. 93-23 in 4 NAT'L RPTR.
Opinions, at 105 (U. Publications of Am., 1993).
150. [d. at 105.
151. [d. at 105-06.
152. [d. at 105.
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document whereby Law Firm limits the objectives of its
representation and Borrower consents to Law Firm representing the Lender in disputes which may arise between
Borrower and Lender in the future involving the mortgage
loan . . . . Upon completion of the closing such representation is deemed to be concluded. ls3
The Bar Association then reviewed Rule 1.9(a), which provides
that an attorney "who has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter . . . unless the former client consents
after consultation. "IS4 In light of Rule 1.9, the Bar Association
commented that despite the waiver of the Borrower, situations involving the continued representation of the Lender could arise which
might be adverse to the interests of the Borrower .ISS In this event,
an attorney would be required to obtain additional consent from the
former client, the Borrower, or forego the continued representation
of the Lender. IS6
The New ¥ ork State Bar Association Ethics Committee (New
York Committee) also considered the propriety of multiple representation of sellers and lenders in real estate transactions. The New
York Committee concluded that an attorney should not represent
both parties, except under unusual circumstances, and then only if
the conditions of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) are satisfied.1S7 The New
York Committee first recognized that multiple representation of a
buyer and seller may ethically occur where "there is an agreement
on price, time and manner of payment and other basic business
terms."IS8 In the case of seller and lender, the attorney should be
careful to determine "after weighing the specific facts and circumstances ... that it is not likely that the interest of these parties will
differ," and should procure each client's consent after full disclosure
of the implications. 1S9 The New York Committee explained the potentially differing interests that can occur between sellers and lenders:
If, for example, issues arise concerning the acceptability of
title, or environmental conditions, or some other condition
of closing, the seller may desire to close while the lender
may decide it has no obligation to make the loan. In that
event, the lawyer may be obligated to withdraw from rep153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

[d. at 105-06.
[d. at 106.
[d.
[d.
New York State Bar Ass'o Op. 611 (1990) in 1990 WL 304218, at *1.
[d.
[d. at *2.
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resenting either party, with possible delay and disruption to
the pending transaction. 1OO
In direct conflict with the consensus existing among the various
state courts and state bar associations that multiple representation
may be ethically undertaken, one commentator urges attorneys to
decline to undertake multiple representation in residential real estate
settings. 161 According to this argument, "[t]he purchase of a home
is one of the major rites of passage for a great majority of the
American public." 162 Under this approach, the significance of purchasing a home to the average buyer coupled with the inherent
conflict of interest involved in either the buyer-seller or buyer-lender
relationship mitigates against multiple representation. 163 Therefore,
"a lawyer should avoid any attempt to represent more than one
party in a residential real estate transaction. [E]ven the cautious
lawyer may run into unexpected professional responsibility problems
when attempting" multiple representation. l64
2.

Critique of Multiple Representation in Real Estate Transactions

Advocating a blanket denial to undertake mUltiple representation
in the residential real estate setting is problematic because such a
denial understates the client's role by abrogating it completely. 165
Urging attorneys to decline to undertake multiple representation
indicates a lack of appreciation for the ability of clients to make
informed choices once they are apprised of all material facts, and
also fails to take into account practical realities. Particularly in the
residential real estate context, the closing costs associated with securing a first mortgage are substantial enough l66 to make hiring a
160. Id.
161. Philip W. Bolus, Comment, One for All is Worth Two in the Bush: Mixing
Metaphors Creates Lawyer Conflict oj Interest Problems in Residential Real
Estate Transactions, 56 U. CIN. L. REV; 639, 662 (1987).
162. Id. at 639. According to the United States Government statistics, "the purchase
of a residence is 'the single most significant financial step of a lifetime.'" Id.
at 642 (quoting [Current) Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 69, 530, reprinted in
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., SETTLEMENT COSTS AND

163.
164.
165.
166.

You, A HUD GUIDE FOR HOME BUYERS (1977».
Id. at 642-45.
Id. at 662.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988), where Congress outlined the following reasons
for its 1988 amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974:
The Congress finds that significant reforms in the real estate settlement
process are needed to insure that consumers throughout the Nation
are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature
and costs of the settlement process and are protected from unneces-
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separate attorney financially impossible for the average home buyer.
An approach urging attorneys to decline mUltiple representation,
while easily followed, forecloses a realistic option for many middle
income to low income clients-the choice to benefit from an attorney's legal assistance. 167 Unfortunately, this approach runs the risk
of leaving the clients without the assistance of counsel. If an attorney
fully discloses any potential conflicts and reasonably believes the
representation can be undertaken without adverse effect on the
parties' interests, then the clients ought to make the final decision
about whether to hire the attorney. As the Supreme Court of New
Jersey has stated regarding the nature of full disclosure, "[i]t is
utterly insufficient to simply advise a client that he, the attorney,
foresees no conflict of interest and then to ask the client whether
the latter will consent to the multiple representation. This is no more
than an empty form of words. "168 Full disclosure enables a client to
make an informed choice as to whether to hire an attorney.
However, to suggest that the realities of the market dictate that
multiple representation be tolerated, as West Virginia seems to do,l69
does not necessarily compel a finding that mUltiple representation is
per se ethicaL Multiple representation, regardless of the nature of
the real estate market in a particular state, is only ethical if the
attorney follows the mandates of the Model Rules by making the
appropriate disclosures and receiving informed client consent. Before
undertaking mUltiple representation in a real estate setting, the attorney ought to consider whether, under a givell situation, he is
capable of addressing the issues, answering the concerns, and protecting each client. However, an attorney should not undertake
multiple representation because he considers that the practical realities
of the real estate market where he practices law justify such conduct.
West Virginia advises that attorneys make a full disclosure in
writing and also receive client consent in writing. 170 Similarly, Massachusetts suggests that client consent be made in writing. 171 Requiring
an attorney to make written disclosures and to receive written client

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

sarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices that
have developed in some areas of the country.
Id.; see also Michael S. Glassman, Note, Real Estate Settlement and Procedures
Act oj 1974 and Amendments oj 1975: The Congressional Response to High
Settlement Costs, 45 U. eIN. L. REv. 448, 448 (1976) ("These [settlement]
costs can be especially burdensome because they fall due at closing, cannot be
prorated over the life of the mortgage, and in some instances are unreasonable.").
See Brown, supra note 6, at 51.
In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1974).
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 128.
See supra text accompanying note 145.
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consent is important and ought to be mandatory under the Model
Rules. When an attorney accompanies his oral disclosure with a
written disclosure sheet, the attorney enables the client to evaluate,
at his own leisure, the risks and the advantages of the multiple
representation. An attorney should also be obligated to obtain client
consent in writing. First, requiring a client to consent in writing will
not only put the client on notice of the dangers inherent in multiple
representation, but will also make the client more likely to take his
decision more seriously. Second, having the client sign a consent
form also can protect the attorney from later claims by the client
that he did not understand the ramifications of multiple representation, such as the waiver of confidentiality between the multiple
parties. Therefore, written client consent and written disclosure serve
as a safeguard for both the attorney and the client.
South Carolina's approach in the real estate closing situation is
particularly troublesome. 172 In essence, South Carolina allows a type
of multiple representation that is inherently one-sided. According to
the South Carolina Bar Association, with client consent, an attorney
can represent the borrower and lender in a closing, and then represent
the lender against the borrower should future litigation arise. Although the South Carolina Bar has justified its position with reference
to Model Rules 1.2 and 1.9, its reliance upon these two Rules is
misplaced. For example, the comment to Rule 1.9 states that "when
a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests
is clearly prohibited."173 Similarly, Rule 2.2 contemplates that after
the representation in the matter is completed, the attorney shall not
represent any of those parties "in the matter that was the subject of
the intermediation. "174
Even in light of the mandates of Rules 1.2 and 1.9, it is
problematic to suggest that an attorney's loyalties in multiple representation will not be divided when he is financially tied to only one
of the clients. For example, what motivation does the attorney have
to represent the best interests of the borrower, when the lender is
paying his fee?17S South Carolina's approach seems to encourage
multiple representation where the attorney's judgment is skewed at
the outset.

172. See supra text accompanying notes 149-56.
173. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt. (1983).
174. Id. Rule 2.2(c).
175. See discussion infra part VI.F. For a discussion of the problems inherent in
multiple representation where the attorney has had prior dealings with only
one of the parties, see infra part VI.B.
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V. LAWYER FOR THE SITUATION:176 AN ALTERNATIVE
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION MODEL

A.

Defining the "Lawyering for the Situation" Model

Although being a "lawyer for the situation" contemplates operation similar to that imposed by Rule 2.2,177 it also adds some
variations. Examples of matters requiring "situation treatment" include the following: (1) where two or more people, who have not
been clients, bring a problem to a lawyer; (2) where a client becomes
involved with a third party who does not have an attorney; and (3)
where two or more existing clients bring a "situation" to the attorney}78 Yet, " '[l]awyering for the situation' is marginally illicit professional conduct because it violates the principle of unqualified
loyalty to [one] client. "179
Lawyering for the situation has been compared to the representation of an organization under Model Rule 1.13.1 80 "Just as formal
entities cannot make their wishes known directly, neither can 'situations.' "181 The significance of characterizing the representation as a
"situation" is that the attorney represents "no one," but acts in an
effort to devise a common resolution of the problem.
Although defining what constitutes lawyering for the situation
is difficult because the concept is both flexible l82 and fact specific, a
common thread pervades this theory: As the only attorney involved,
he acts as a confidante, an analyst, an interpreter, and an instructor.l 83 The attorney must listen to each party's concerns, discover
their needs, articulate incoherent or weak positions, outline the law,

176. The term "lawyer for the situation" has been attributed to Justice Louis D.
Brandeis. Frank, supra note 1I, at 683-86. In the midst of Senate confirmation
hearings questioning his ethics, Justice Brandeis characterized his past representation of several clients as counsel for the situation. [d.
177. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:102-03.
178. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETmcs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 63-64 (1978)
[hereinafter HAZARD, ETHICS].
.
179. [d. at 64.
180. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, at 312. "A lawyer employed or·retained
by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983).
181. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, at 312.
182. "[U]nlike advocacy or legal counselling involving a single client, lawyering for
a situation is not provided with a structure of goals and constraints from
outside. The lawyer and the clients must create the structure for themselves,
with the lawyer being an active participant." HAZARD, ETmcs, supra note 178,
at 66.
183. [d. at 64.
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and devise a plan or agreement that reflects the common agreement. l84
The attorney "could be said to be playing God. "18S
The "lawyer for the situation," on the other hand, has
choices to make that obviously can go against the interest
of one client or another, as the latter perceives it. A lawyer
who assumes to act as intercessor has to evoke complete
confidence that he will act justly in the circumstances. This
is to perform the role of the administered justice itself, but
without the constraints inherent in the process . . . . A
person may be entrusted with it only if he knows that in
the event of miscarriage he will have no protection from
the law. In this respect, acting as lawyer for the situation
can be thought of as similar to a doctor's "authority" to
terminate the life of a hopeless patient: It can be properly
undertaken only if it will not be questioned afterwards. 186
Although this approach could properly be "fit" into the framework of the Model Rules, it allows the attorney to be more than
just an intermediary or a passive advisor. This approach appears to
encourage the attorney to serve as a third party participant. Lawyering for the situation represents the "ideal forms of intercession
suggested by the models of wise parent or village elder. "187

B.

Critique of the "Lawyering for the Situation" Model

Although lawyering for the situation has its appeal as a departure
from the traditional roles assumed by attorneys, this approach presents some potential problems. As Geoffrey Hazard, the promulgator
of this approach, concedes, "[p]laying God is a tricky business. "188
Not only must the clients place an incredible amount of trust in the
attorney, but they also must defer to the attorney's "judgment." In
addition to these concerns, a conscientious attorney will likely decline
to assume such an omniscient role because of doubts regarding his
or her own wisdom and sense of judgment.
Some basic assumptions underlying this approach also are troublesome. First, Hazard assumes that an attorney does indeed "know
what is best" for a group of clients. 189 A lawyering model based
·upon such an assumption seems prone to a paternalistic form of
representation. Often clients with a prevailing common interest need
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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a referee rather than a "village elder." Unlike the clients, the attorney
is often in a superior position, having the resources available to
ensure a particular outcome. Although in an ideal world an attorney
would not overreach, but would rather serve as consensus builder,
in reality the opposite may be true. The more active the role that
the attorney assumes, the more likely that an attorney will impose
his or her judgment upon the decision of the group. As a master of
both the law and the subtle art of persuasion, an attorney can
influence the desired outcome. As a trained advocate, the attorney's
active participatory role, as Hazard contemplates it, may forge a
solution or an agreement never intended by the parties.
Second, as Hazard admits, this flexible lawyering model has not
been championed by members of the bar, and "[t]he fact that it has
not been may itself be worth exploring. "190 Lawyering· for the situation has not been endorsed by bar associations, probably because
it is a model that involves proceeding on an ad hoc basis. 191 To
assume that attorneys want to engage in a mUltiple representation
situation with few guidelines is problematic. First, attorneys are
accustomed to applying rules. A large portion of law school and the
practice of law consists of the application of "black -letter" law.
Second, a sparsity of guidelines increases the likelihood that an
attorney may run afoul of the ethical norms of the disciplinary
rules-a proposition that promulgators of the disciplinary rules have
probably recognized. 192
Despite these legitimate concerns, lawyering for the situation
embraces the spirit of what multiple representation ought to accomplish. In this model, "[w]hat the lawyer actually does is let the parties
to the situation share his knowledge, skill and judgment. "193 Using
one attorney "discourage[s] [the] escalation of conflict and recruit-

190. [d. at 65.
191. See supra note 182.
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983). The Preamble

to the Model Rules states in pertinent part:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict
between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and
to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while
earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct
prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of
these Rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise.
Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic underlying principles
of the Rules.
[d.
193. ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 279, 281 (Michael Davis & Frederick A.
Elliston eds., 1986).
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ment of
allies"l94 among the parties. Therefore, the parties
benefit by saving time and money and by resolving the situation on
an amicable basis.
In addition to the benefit that can accrue to the individual
clients, multiple representation also can produce positive side-effects
in society. As one commentator describes, the attorney that categorically declines multiple representation and encourages each client to
retain separate attorneys disserves the public: 19s
In the litigation process, a lawyer might be disciplined for
representing conflicting interests. There is no comparable
disciplinary proceeding that enables the profession to assert
that a lawyer is overbearing or too demanding for requiring
two lawyers where one might do. The public's remedy is to
avoid lawyers entirely. That result should be regarded as a
disservice to the public. l96
Another positive side-effect that may accrue to society is the
decrease in litigation. According to another commentator, "[t]he
presence of multiple attorneys may also promote more litigiousness
than there needs to be."I97 For instance, where three clients might
be able to reach an agreement "in an informal setting, it may be
that such agreement will be difficult where both sides are represented
by attorneys before an actual conflict has arisen."198 Multiple representation, therefore, appears to benefit both individual clients and
society.
VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN UNDERTAKING
MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
When undertaking multiple representation, an attorney should
conduct himself in accordance with either Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2
because, unlike the lawyering for the situation model, each Rule
provides a concrete set of guidelines. At a minimum, each Rule
obligates an attorney to consult with his clients about the implications
of the multiple representation and the advantages and risks involved,
and to obtain client consent. l99 In addition, both Rules ensure that
the clients are apprised of material' facts before they agree to a
multiple representation arrangement.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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199.

HAZARD, ETHICS, supra note 178, at 64.
See Brown, supra note 6, at 51.
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See Kipnis, supra note 3, at 286.
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Whether the attorney should operate under Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2
depends upon the facts of each case. In determining whether Rule
1.7 or Rule 2.2 should be applied, the attorney should consider the
following factors: (1) The relationship between the parties,2°O (2) the
prior dealings between the parties,201 (3) whether the parties are
existing clients ,202 (4) the degree to which the parties need to be
apprised of the applicable law/03 (5) what role the attorney will serve
in drafting agreements,204 and (6) the fee arrangement between the
clients and the attorney. 20S By analyzing each factor, an attorney is
better able to judge the scope of his potential representation and the
degree to which conflicts, actual or potential, may affect the multiple
representation.
If the representation is more complicated at the outset, this
would weigh in favor of the application of Rule 2.2, because this
Rule requires fuller disclosure by the attorney than Rule 1.7. 206
Likewise, if the situation between the parties is more susceptible to
conflicts, the application of Rule 2.2 is favored because it requires
a more in depth evaluation by the attorney than Rule 1.7. 207 Although
an attorney may initially opt to follow Rule 1.7, the attorney's
subsequent evaluation regarding the scope of his representation, or
the nature of actual or potential conflicts between the parties, or
both, might convince the attorney to follow Rule 2.2 instead.

A.

Relationship Between the Parties

In deciding to undertake multiple representation, the attorney
should first consider the relationship between the parties. By their
very nature, some relationships are ridden with conflicts. For example, conflicts are less likely to exist between two buyers as opposed
to a buyer and a seller. To the extent the relationship is not prone
to conflicts, the likelihood that a conflict will develop is naturally
minimized. If the relationship appears amicable at the outset, the
attorney probably only needs to follow Rule 1.7. If, however, the
relationship becomes adverse, an attorney should engage in the more
extensive evaluation process that is mandated by Rule 2.2.208 To the
extent that any conflicts cannot be reconciled, the attorney may be
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obligated by Rule 2.2 to withdraw from the representation. 209
Even where it may appear that the parties have an overriding
common interest, the relationship may possess subtle conflicts. For
example, "power dynamics" underlying the reiationship21O may prevent the "matter [from being) resolved on terms compatible with the
clients' best interests" or prevent each client from making informed
decisions. 211 For example, "[a] contemplated 50-50 partnership may
have deeply unsurfaced aspects because of age, wealth, know-how,
and motivational differences between the two parties. "212 Rather than
a neutral attorney, the dominated party needs an advocate.213
Prior to undertaking representation of the parties seeking to set
up a joint venture to sell industrial equipment, Attorney Jane from
Act I, Scene 1 ought to be aware of warning signs that might indicate
the existence of potential conflicts between Arnold, Betty, and Emily.
Whether proceeding under Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2, Attorney Jane should
consider the following questions: Is one of her clients more sophisticated in business matters such that he or she may dominate the
others?214 Are Arnold, Betty, and Emily already disagreeing about
the amount of each partner's initial capital contribution, or that
partnership voting rights should not be equal?2lS Have Arnold, Betty,
and Emily failed to discuss some significant issues, such as the
amount of financing required by the joint venture, or how to handle
a withdrawing partner?216 Are Arnold, Betty, and Emily disturbed
by the idea that they may keep no secrets and that all negotiations
must occur jointly?217 To the extent that anyone of these questions
is answered affirmatively, Attorney Jane should consider that multiple
representation may be inappropriate.
Assessing whether multiple representation should be undertaken
also depends upon whether Attorney Jane "reasonably believes" that
none of the parties will be adversely affected.218 To the degree that

209. See id. Rule 2.2(c).
210. The term "power dynamics" loosely refers to those factors underlying the
parties' relationship that enables one party to dominate or control the judgment
or decision making ability of the other party, such as age, wealth, social skills,
emotional well-being, motivational differences, and/or business sophistication.
See Brown, supra note 6, at 51; Robert G. Spector, The Do's and Dont's
When One Lawyer Represents Both Parties, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1991, at 16,
17.
211. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a)(2) (1983).
212. Brown, supra note 6, at 51.
213. Spector, supra note 210, at 17.
214. See id. at 17.
215. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 cmt. (1983).
216. See Spector, supra note 210, at 17.
217. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:202.
218. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 & Rule 2.2 (1983).
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the relationship between Arnold, Betty, and Emily is antagonistic or
bound to lead to "contentious litigation or negotiations," Attorney
Jane should decline representation. 219 If, however, Attorney Jane
believes in good faith that she can neutralize the effects of any power
dynamics that may exist, multiple representation would be ethical,
arid has often been successful where parties are seeking the formation
of a business entity or the establishment of a joint venture to sell
industrial equipment. Unlike the situation where parties are seeking
to dissolve a partnership, if Attorney Jane's multiple representation
fails, the end result is that the joint venture does not succeed.
Attorney Jane will not confront the situation where Arnold, Betty,
and Emily bring lawsuits against each other if the multiple representation fails.

B.

Prior Dealings with the Parties

Another consideration in an attorney's decision to undertake
multiple representation is whether he has had prior dealings with one
of the parties. Commentators disagree over the course the attorney
should take when confronted with this situation. To the extent that
the attorney has represented one of the parties in the past, serving
as an intermediary may be improper "when impartiality cannot· be
maintained. "220 A salient example of when intermediation may be
inappropriate exists when the attorney has represented one of the
clients "for a long period and in a variety of matters," and has just
been introduced to the new client.221 Other commentators believe that
if the attorney has had either a close professional or personal
relationship with any of the parties, multiple representation should
not be undertaken: 222 "[A] lawyer can hardly be thought of as neutral
when he or she has benefitted from one of the parties as a client or
may do so in the future."223 As a practical matter, an attorney should
probably recommend that the "new client or clients" seek independent counsel. 224
An example of when multiple representation might be appropriate is when the attorney is asked to establish an equal partnership.22s
If the parties are "friendly and cooperative," have "similar business
abilities and objectives," and are in a financial position to hire
separate attorneys should the representation fail, multiple represen219.
220.
221.
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224.
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tation can be ethical. 226 The attorney should ask the parties with
whom he has no prior dealings the following questions: What advantage do they see in using one attorney? Why are the clients
unwilling to hire separate attorneys? Are each of the clients in a
financial position to hire separate attorneys? In addition, the attorney
should ask his current client the following questions: Who is responsible for my fee? Are you aware that I may have to disclose to the
remaining parties information that I have acquired through my
representation of you in the past if it materially affects this transaction? Who suggested that I represent all of these parties? The
answers to both sets of these questions will aid the attorney in
determining if all parties are aware of the meaning of mUltiple
representation, and their intentions in only using one attorney. To
the extent that the attorney thinks that his client has improperly
influenced the other parties' consent to multiple representation, the
attorney should decline mUltiple representation.
Discretion also weighs in favor of the attorney declining multiple
representation when he serves as general counsel for one party.227
Unlike the situation where an attorney owes allegiance to all clients
equally, a situation where an attorney is financially tied to one client
is fraught with difficulty. An attorney may find it difficult, if not
impossible, to distance himself from his "employer." In addition,
after the attorney discloses his financial relationship with his employer
to the other party, the informed party is unlikely to allow that
attorney to also represent him. Even if a party consents to mUltiple
representation after full disclosure, an attorney should, nevertheless,
seriously question whether his financial ties to the client will impair
his independent judgment.
Attorney Kate of Act I, Scene 3 faces a potential dilemma if
she chooses to represent the lender, seller, and buyer in the residential
real estate transaction described therein. Although Attorney Kate
does not serve as general counsel to Lender Bank, she has been
retained by Lender Bank in the past. Therefore, her financial ties to
Lender Bank appear to be more complex than if she had only been
hired for one transaction. Before considering whether to undertake
the representation of Lender Bank, Sam Seller, and Bob Borrower,
Attorney Kate must disclose her prior dealings with Lender Bank.
By making the disclosure, Attorney Kate may be relieved of making
a decision because neither Sam Seller nor Bob Borrower may be
comfortable with her representation. In all likelihood, Sam Seller

226. [d.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42 (The state of Illinois prohibits an
attorney who serves as general counsel for a lending institution from representing the buyer in the same real estate transaction).
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and Bob Borrower may only have a Hobbesian choice: either they
jointly accept Attorney Kate's multiple representation or they forego
representation altogether because of the expense. Therefore, when
making her decision to undertake representation, Attorney Kate
should weigh not only the strength of her loyalty to Lender Bank,
but also how her refusal to undertake multiple representation will
affect the transaction. If her refusal means that Sam Seller and Bob
Borrower are unrepresented, then perhaps Attorney Kate ought to
reevaluate her decision.
If Attorney Kate ultimately decides to undertake the representation, despite her prior dealings with Lender Bank, she should satisfy
the following conditions: (1) Attorney Kate must disclose the prior
relationship; (2) she must be convinced that Sam Seller and Bob
Borrower are comfortable with her divided loyalties; and (3) she
must be confident that Sam Seller and Bob Borrower will not be
apprehensive about "confiding in someone else's lawyer. "228
C.

Existing Clients

Connecticut seems to have adopted the most sound approach to
multiple representation of existing clients. 229 By requiring the existing
clients to agree upon all essential terms without the participation of
an attorney, Connecticut helps ensure that the attorney remains
neutral. 230 Without proscribing these additional limits, as Connecticut
seems to have done, allowing mUltiple representation in accordance
with either Rule 1.7 or Rule 2.2 may cause the attorney unforeseen
problems because all clients are not necessarily similarly situated.
Attorney John of Act I, Scene 2 may experience loyalty problems
if he chooses to represent his existing clients, Peter Purchaser and
Sheila Seller, in connection with the purchase and sale of the seafood
restaurant. Perhaps one of the two has generated a disproportionate
share of Attorney John's fees over the years. Thus, Attorney John
may unknowingly be predisposed toward one of the clients and thus
sacrifice his impartiality. Unless Attorney John is assured that Peter
Purchaser and Sheila Seller have in fact agreed upon the material
terms of their transaction, he should not undertake the representation.
In the event that Peter Purchaser and Sheila Seller have not ironed
out the details to Attorney John's satisfaction, the best tactic may
be to recommend that each client either seek separate counselor seek
another attorney as an intermediary.

D.

Apprising the Parties oj the Applicable Law

Assuming that Attorney John decides that the mUltiple representation of Peter Purchaser and Sheila Seller is appropriate because
228. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
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neither party has generated a significant amount of his legal fees so
as to impinge his loyalty to either client, Attorney John must obtain
each client's consent to the multiple representation. Before Peter
Purchaser and Sheila Seller can consent and make informed decisions
during the negotiation process, Attorney John must apprise both
clients of the law governing the transaction. Although Peter Purchaser and Sheila Seller are experienced business persons, they probably do not understand their rights and responsibilities under state
or federal law.23I For example, Attorney John must advise Peter
Purchaser about some of the warranties he may want to secure from
Sheila Seller. Additionally, Peter Purchaser may not have asked
Sheila Seller about inspections, parking permits, or the sale of a
liquor license before he decided to purchase her seafood restaurant.
Likewise, Sheila Seller may not expect the sale to be subject to Peter
Purchaser's contingency requirements.
In addition to advising each client about his or her respective
rights and obligations, Attorney John should also explain what role
the intermediary serves. Attorney John should inform Sheila Seller
and Peter Purchaser that he will provide each client with the benefit
of his skill and knowledge, but that he cannot advocate either client's
position. Therefore, Peter Purchaser and Sheila Seller need to understand that Attorney John cannot "present the best position for
either party. "232

E.

Drafting Agreements
Before undertaking multiple representation, the attorney must
consider that he cannot draft agreements that unnecessarily favor
one party. For example, "[i]f the tentative figures do favor one party
(because of mutual error, for example), [the lawyer] must feel entirely
free to suggest amendments, without fear that the favored party will
feel betrayed. "233 In addition to suggesting alternatives, the attorney
also "must be careful to explain to each client alternative provisions
that are to his advantage and disadvantage. "234 If the lawyer either
reasonably believes that one party "would feel betrayed by having
his or her advantage taken away," or later discovers this to be true,
the attorney should decline or terminate the representatioll. 235 To
adopt the view that the attorney serves only as the scrivener abrogates
the attorney's fiduciary duty to act fairly and equitably toward each
client; each client deserves to be informed about how each provision
will impact his interest and the alternative provisions that might be
included. 236 To suggest that the attorney is only a scrivener is to
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suggest that the attorney bears no responsibility for the final agreement should it unnecessarily discriminate against one of the partiesa proposition the Maryland courts have rejected. 237 An attorney
should not serve as the rubber stamp for a transaction where only
one client is making the decisions.
Attorney Jane of Act I, Scene 1 should initially be concerned if
Arnold, Betty, and Emily are asking her to be a scrivener in connection with the formation of their partnership. If the parties do not
want Attorney Jane's advice or suggestions about their agreement,
then Attorney Jane should seriously consider declining multiple representation. If, however, the parties are willing to listen to Attorney
Jane's proposals and suggestions, then multiple representation is
probably appropriate. Because the parties do not have a formal
agreement in writing, Attorney Jane has considerable leeway in
directing the negotiation process. Attorney Jane can supervise the
discussions between Arnold, Betty, and Emily and ensure that all
issues are addressed by the formal agreement. By directing the scope
of the discussion, Attorney Jane can ensure that Arnold, Betty, and
Emily understand their accompanying rights and responsibilities with
respect to each .provision in their partnership agreement.

F.

Fee Arrangements

Multiple representation may be unwarranted depending upon
how the fee arrangements are structured. If an attorney learns at the
Supreme Court of Florida confronted the situation where an attorney, Belleville,
drafted the documents in a real estate transaction between the buyer and seller.
[d. at 171. Although the buyer, Bloch, and the seller, Cowan, only negotiated
for the sale of an apartment building, the documents stated that Cowan was
selling both the apartment building and his residence. [d. In exchange, Cowan
only received an unsecured note providing for 10070 interest to be amortized
over a 25 year period. [d.
In considering whether attorney Belleville committed ethical violations, the
supreme court first noted that Belleville should have realized from the documents alone that the transaction was "one-sided." [d. at 172. According to
the supreme court, Belleville should have explained (I) that he was representing
an adverse interest, and (2) that the material terms in the documents that he
drafted "so that the opposing party fully understands their actual effect." [d.
The court stated: "When the transaction is as one-sided as that in the present
case, counsel preparing the documents is under an ethical duty to make sure
that an unrepresented party understands the possible detrimental effect of the
transaction and the fact that the attorney's loyalty lies with the client alone."
[d. The court then suspended Belleville from the practice of law for 30 days.
[d. Based upon Belleville, if an attorney can be suspended for drafting
documents that unnecessarily favor a party who is not his client, then an
attorney should have a duty to draft documents that do not unnecessarily favor
one group of clients.
237. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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outset that only one of the clients is responsible for the fee, the
attorney ought to consider two potential problems. First, the financial
resources of one party may be used against the other parties to coax
arrangements that favor the "money-man." Second, the attorney's
impartiality in the situation may be compromised. A natural response
by an attorney is to extend more loyalty toward' the individual
"paying the bill." To the extent that the attorney follows the fee,
he or she may face disciplinary action. 238 Even the most impartial
attorney may find that his equal allegiance toward all clients might
wane over time.
The fee arrangement proposed by Leon Loan Officer in Act I,
Scene 3 does not appear to present a problem for Attorney Kate if
she decides to undertake representation of the parties in their real
estate transaction. In this scene, all three clients have agreed to be
responsible for one-third of the fees. Attorney Kate might want to
inquire where Bob Borrower is receiving the money for his one-third
of the fee. For example, if Bob Borrower is receiving his "fee funds"
from Lender Bank, he may be inclined to follow Lender Bank on
all issues out of a desire to have his property financed. Although
having Bob Borrower's fee financed may not necessarily affect Attorney Kate's loyalty to Bob Borrower, she may find herself in a
position where Lender Bank is dictating the terms of the agreement
at the expense of Bob Borrower. Provided that Lender Bank does
not dominate the discussions and coerce decisions, the equal division
of the fee does not appear to present loyalty concerns for Attorney
Kate.
VII.

CONCLUSION

When an attorney is confronted with the opportunity for multiple
representation in Maryland, the impulse to categorically decline the
representation is no longer an appropriate response. While it remains
true that the avoidance of multiple representation will spare the
attorney from confronting ethical dilemmas, this stance indicates a
lack of appreciation for the multi-faceted roles that attorneys now
serve. Particularly when an attorney operates on a transactional level,
multiple representation may become necessary to serve all of the·
client's needs. When multiple representation succeeds', the attorney
not only saves money for a group of clients, but can also often
"sustain[] good relations between the parties that will pay dividends
in the future. "239 If an attorney is honestly interested in assisting and
advising clients, particularly those of modest means, and nurturing
238. See, e.g., In re Moore, 703 P.2d 961, 965 (Or. 1985).
239. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 2.2:202.
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attorney-client relationships, mUltiple representation seemingly offers
the attorney a viable alternative.
The attorney's role in multiple representation is best understood
as explaining the applicable law to the parties, sharpening the issues,
and describing both the advantages and disadvantages of the potential
alternatives. To characterize the attorney as a "scrivener" is to miss
the point of multiple representation. The attorney has a fiduciary
obligation to ensure that the negotiations and any subsequent agreements are the product of clients who are making decisions on an
informed basis and on an equal footing.
The more often Maryland attorneys champion the role of intermediary and serve both as counselors and advisors to multiple clients,
the more likely it seems that lawyering will not necessarily be equated
with the courtroom. A positive side-effect also will accrue to clients.
Although the role that the litigation process serves should not be
minimized where the courts are often the only proper or realistic
arena for legal redress, the current state of litigation might be
drastically different if clients were more inclined to seek one attorney
to help maximize their common goals and iron out their insignificant
differences of opinion. Perhaps clients would be less quick to respond, "I'll see you in court," when the first impasse arises.
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